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The Redemption Puzzle 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 
 
 
 Before 2003, a common theme of tax and corporate law scholarship was the 
“dvidend puzzle.”2 The dividend puzzle referred to the tendency of US public 
corporations to pay dividends to their shareholders despite the fact that until 2003 
dividends were subject to a significantly higher level of tax than redemptions. For a 
publicly traded corporation, it is easy to structure an open-market share repurchase 
program in a way that ensures that shareholders that participate and offer their shares 
for redemption would qualify for capital gain treatment under IRC section 302(b). Since 
redemption treatment permitted shareholders to both qualify for the lower capital gain tax 
rate and to use part of their basis, whereas dividend treatment resulted in both a higher 
tax rate for upper bracket taxable shareholders and no offset for basis, the question 
arose why US public corporations ever paid out dividends. 
 
 Various explanations have been given for this puzzle, and I will not go into them 
here.3 Importantly, the factual background underlying the puzzle changed in 2003, when 
Congress amended the Code to provide (through 2010) for the same 15% rate for 
dividends and for capital gains. Part of the rationale for this adoption of partial 
corporate/shareholder tax integration was that the higher dividend rate encouraged 
corporations to needlessly retain earnings, even though public corporations could 
achieve the same result via redemptions.4 
 
 This paper briefly explores what happened after 2003. As summarized in a recent 
article by Bratton and Wachter: 
 
 
Figure 1 below tracks shareholder payouts in the form of  
dividends and stock repurchases by the companies in the S&P 500  
from 1987 to 2007.  The year 1987 is taken as the start date because it  
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open-market repurchases by public companies. The 1987 year-end  
S&P 500 average (247), the companies’ total annual dividend pay- 
ments in 1987 ($44.3 billion) and their 1987 total repurchases ($32.5  
billion) are pegged at 100 on the vertical axis.  Figure 1 shows relative  
increases and decreases to 2008, when the S&P 500 closed at 366, total  
dividends were $247 billion, and total repurchases were $340 billion.   
A break in two longstanding trends occurred in 2004.  Prior thereto,  
increases in levels of dividends and levels of repurchases roughly  
tracked increases in stock prices (with both tending to lag behind the  
market).  There was also a trend of rough parity between total dividends and total 
repurchases.  Both trends ended in 2003 in favor of  
an increase in net amounts paid out, with the lion’s share of the in-  
crease in the form of repurchases.  In 1987, repurchases amounted to  
1.6% of average market capitalization, and total payout amounted to  
3.8%; in 2007, repurchases amounted to 4.6%, and total payout  
amounted to 6.3%.  The dollar amount of annual repurchases in-  




The data assembled by Bratton and Wachter indicate a remarkable fact: 
Following the adoption of partial integration, there was only a modest increase in 
dividends during the period 2004-7, from about 300 to about 500 (if 1987 levels 
are set at 100). Redemptions, however, showed a remarkable increase, jumping 
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from about the same as dividends (300) to 1,800.6 This, therefore, leads to a new 
puzzle: Why the sudden sharp increase in redemptions following 2003? 
 
Bratton and Wachter explain the total increase in both types of distribution as a 
response by public corporations to increased pressure by shareholders to 
distribute earnings. This pressure came especially from hedge funds, which 
played an increasingly important role as shareholder activists in this period.7 
 
But this hypothesis, while persuasive, does not explain the form of the 
distributions. Why engage in more redemptions precisely when the tax bias 
against dividends was reduced? This is the “redemption puzzle”. 
 
Like the dividend puzzle, the redemption puzzle is susceptible to several 
explanations. For example, Bratton and Wachter note that managers who hold 
stock options tend to favor redemptions over dividends.8 But in this case, I 
believe there is also a tax explanation for the puzzle, related to the different 
treatment of redemptions and dividends to foreign shareholders. 
 
In the case of taxable US shareholders, under post-2003 law, a dividend and a 
redemption that qualifies as a capital gain transaction under one of the tests set 
out in IRC 302(b) are both taxed at 15%. The only difference is that in a 
qualifying redemption taxpayers may offset basis, which has led some 
commentators to suggest erasing this remaining difference.9 However, it seems 
unlikely that basis offset is enough to explain the remarkable post-2003 
preference for redemptions. 
 
For foreign shareholders, on the other hand, a significant difference remains 
between redemptions and dividends after 2003. A redemption that qualifies as a 
capital gain transaction would result in no tax to a foreign shareholder because 
capital gains are generally sourced to the residence of the seller. A dividend by a 
US corporation, on the other hand, is subject to a withholding tax of 30% 
(reduced to 15% under treaties, but not below that). 
 
If Bratton and Wachter are correct in attributing most of the post-2003 increase in 
total corporate payouts to pressure from hedge funds, then this difference in the 
treatment of foreign shareholders may account for a significant part of the post-








N!@6+1'!A1<.2!"A Better Way to Tax Corporate Distributions: Allow Basis 
Recovery on Ordinary Dividends", working paper (2010).!
3
Avi-Yonah:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
puzzle. Most hedge funds operate offshore for both tax and regulatory reasons, 
and therefore dividend payouts to them would generally be subject to the 30% 
withholding tax (and generally not the lower 15% treaty rate, because most of 
them are in non-treaty jurisdictions). Redemptions, on the other hand, would not 
be subject to tax to foreign hedge funds. 
 
A recent report by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has 
illustrated the tax sensitivity of foreign hedge funds to dividend withholding 
taxes.10 The report showed that many foreign-based hedge funds avoided 
withholding taxes on dividends by instead holding total return equity swaps on 
the equity of US corporations. Before 2010, payments of dividend equivalents on 
such swaps were deemed not to be US source and therefore not subject to 
withholding tax, even though they were economically equivalent to the dividends 
on the underlying stock. This finding led Congress to enact IRC 871(l) in 2010, 
subjecting most dividend equivalents to withholding tax. 
 
If I am correct in supposing that foreign hedge funds are a primary beneficiary 
from the recent rise in redemptions, then I would suggest that Congress should 
take one further step by excluding foreign shareholders from the scope of IRC 
302 and 304. The result would be that redemption payments by US corporations 
to foreign shareholders would be treated as dividends and subject to withholding 
tax, thus eliminating the bias in favor of redemptions.  
 
To understand this proposal, it is important to step back and ask why are 
dividends and capital gains treated differently to foreign shareholders. After all, a 
capital gain is simply the sum of the value of the current earnings of a corporation 
plus the present value of its future earnings, and both of those are the funds from 
which dividends are paid. Thus, as an economic matter, dividends should be 
treated in the same way as capital gains. 
 
In the case of foreign shareholders, however, there is an important 
administrability difference between dividends and capital gains. Dividends are 
paid out by a US corporation and therefore can easily be subject to a withholding 
tax. Capital gains, however, result from a sale that may occur offshore between a 
foreign seller and buyer of the US corporation’s stock. Such a sale is difficult to 
subject to withholding tax in most cases.11 Therefore, capital gains have always 
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(FDAP) income that is subject to withholding under IRC 871 and 881, and in 
most cases have also been deemed to be foreign source. 
 
However, this rationale does not apply in the case of redemptions. In a 
redemption, the US corporation is the source of the funds that are paid to the 
foreign shareholder, just as it is in the case of a dividend. In both situations, the 
funds can easily be subject to withholding.12 
 
The reason redemptions are not subject to withholding under current aw is that 
IRC section 302 (and its corollary in IRC 304) have not explicitly been limited to 
taxable US shareholders, even though that was clearly Congress’ intent. IRC 302 
was intended to prevent taxable US shareholders from “bailing out” earnings and 
profits at capital gains rate by means of redemptions, and IRC 304 has the same 
intent for sales between commonly controlled corporations. 
 
The application of IRC 302 and 304 to foreign shareholders and to foreign 
corporations has already had several perverse effects that are unrelated to the 
redemption puzzle. The application of IRC 304 to foreign corporations has 
enabled US corporate shareholders to repatriate profits as deemed dividends 
while avoiding the foreign tax credit limitations.13 The application of IRC 302 to 
foreign corporations and foreign shareholders underlay the notorious KPMG FLIP 
(Foreign Leveraged Investment Program) tax shelter.14 In both cases, the IRS 
was limited in its ability to argue against the inappropriate results because it had 
approved the application of IRC 304 to foreign corporations in some cases. 
 
The solution is Congressional action. Congress should simply modify IRC 302  
and 304 by excluding foreign shareholders and corporations from their scope, 
just like it did in IRC 367 in regard to the reorganization provisions. Arguably, tax-
exempt domestic shareholders should be excluded as well, for the same reason: 
IRC 302 and 304 were drafted with taxable US shareholders in mind. 
 
This would not be a revenue raiser, because presumably foreign shareholders 
would simply sell their shares to other foreigners rather than participate in 
redemptions subject to withholding tax. But it would relieve the tax-induced 
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rather than dividends. Excessive pressure on corporate management to 
distribute earnings in any form may lead to short-termist behavior, as Bratton and 
Wachter point out.15 But even if one believes that distributions are appropriate, 
there is no reason to have tax-based distinctions between otherwise identical 
forms of distribution. 
 
Of course, if Congress were to make the 15% rate for dividends permanent, then 
it could go further and repeal IRC 302 and 304 (as well as other complex 
provisions like IRC 306 and 344). But this seems unlikely at present, and in fact if 
Congress does nothing this year the full rate differential for dividends comes 
back in 2011. This would put further pressure on IRC 302 and 304 and 
exacerbate the tendency to favor redemptions over dividends.  
 
We have gone from a dividend puzzle to a redemption puzzle, but perhaps the 
redemption puzzle is easier to solve. Congress should act to make both a thing 
of the past by equalizing the rates on redemptions and dividends for both 
domestic and foreign shareholders.16 For domestic shareholders the solution is to 
make the rate equalization of current law permanent. For foreign shareholders, 
since we cannot as an administrative matter tax all capital gains, we should at 
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